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This article addresses an important, overlooked regulatory challenge during global health emergencies (GHEs).
It provides novel insights into how, and why, best practice can support decision makers in interpreting and
implementing key guidance on conducting research during GHEs. The ability to conduct research before, during
and after such events is crucial. The recent West-African Ebola outbreaks and the Zika virus have highlighted
considerable room for improvement in meeting the imperative to research and rapidly develop effective
therapies. A means of effectively capturing these experiences and folding them into future decision-making
is lacking; the need for effective practical translational measures remains. The challenge for the research com-
munity lies in extracting meaningful action-guiding content from pre-existing guidelines—which draw upon
practical examples of guidelines ‘in action’—that assist in determining how to act in a particular (future) situ-
ation. Insights are provided into the role of best practice as a means to do so; such examples can provide
invaluable support to decision makers in interpreting high-level guidance; overarching guidelines retain their
necessary level of generality and flexibility, whilst corresponding best practice examples—which incorporate
important lessons learned—illustrate how such guidelines can be interpreted at a practical level.
Introduction
Global health emergencies (GHEs) trigger profound im-
mediate and long-lasting consequences at the local, na-
tional and international levels, as evidenced by H5N1,
the more recent West-African Ebola Outbreak and the
ongoing Zika virus crisis. The World Health
Organization (WHO) is responsible for declaring
when such an emergency arises (what it officially
refers to as a ‘Public Health Emergency of
International Concern’ or ‘PHEIC’). Under the
International Health Regulations (IHR) 2005, a
PHEIC is defined as ‘an extraordinary event which is
determined: a. to constitute a public health risk to
other States through the international spread of disease;
and b. to potentially require a coordinated international
response’ (WHO, 2015b).1
GHEs engage a broad spectrum of actors and institu-
tions. Individual states are responsible for notifying the
WHO of potential GHEs, for surveilling and containing
the spread of disease, as well as offering treatment to
their citizens. Given that GHEs ‘do not respect national
borders’ (WHO, 2016), governments are also obliged to
take into consideration the needs of other countries
(particularly those of low-income countries). At the
international level, the WHO is responsible for coordi-
nating international response. However, numerous add-
itional actors play key roles in managing responses to
GHEs,2 including researchers and research institutions;
governments; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs);
pharmaceutical companies; international organizations;
and collaborative networks (Ganguli Mitra and Sethi,
2016). Indeed, each GHE has the tendency to catalyse
the establishment of more (increasingly international)
global health collaborations, particularly in the form of
public private partnerships.
The ability to conduct research is particularly import-
ant in the GHE setting, in cases where novel pathogenic
viruses emerge and corresponding therapeutics are non-
existent (as demonstrated with Ebola and Zika), as well
as to track the spread of already identified viruses. While
‘the need to learn as much as possible as quickly as pos-
sible’ (WHO, 2016: 30) has been stressed, most recently
in the revised Council for International Organization
for Medical Sciences (CIOMS) guidelines, the relation-
ship between response and research gives rise to numer-
ous (ethical and regulatory) tensions. For example,
despite the distinct regulatory mechanisms for offering
treatment versus conducting research (Calain et al.,
2009: 10), the lines between the two activities are
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easily blurred (Kass et al., 2013; Willison et al., 2014)
particularly during GHEs (Hunt et al., 2012). Further
complexity is added given that the research community
is subject to various—at times conflicting—obligations,
which stem from a variety of sources. Interactions be-
tween national and international laws are often compli-
cated, and the ambiguous obligations derived out of
various codes and treaties give rise to further uncertain-
ties around the application of guidelines (Irwin, 2010;
Gostin et al., 2015).
Given these complexities, this article deals with two
related but distinct and equally pressing issues. First,
despite the numerous guidelines engaged when research
takes place during GHEs, the interpretation of pre-exist-
ing guidelines is challenging and decision makers re-
quire additional support in applying guidelines
concretely. Further, it has been noted that despite the
emerging guidance on ‘lessons learned’ from GHEs
(most recently from Ebola and Zika), what is lack-
ing—and needed—is increased effort to ‘translate’
these lessons into policy and practice (Smith and
Upshur, 2015). Whilst reports have highlighted the
need for greater investment in prevention, domestically
and internationally (WHO, 2015a) the ways in which
both (i) interpretation of guidance can be supported
and (ii) lessons learned can be incorporated into pre-
existing guidance, have not received the attention that
they demand. Given the numerous and profound effects
which GHEs can have on individuals, and the integral
role of research in mitigating these effects, it is impera-
tive that we support the research community in navigat-
ing the challenging issues which arise in the GHE
context.
In tending to this problem, this article advances an
approach that can support decision makers in interpret-
ing and extracting meaningful action-guiding content
from guidelines in a manner which captures practical
realities and lessons learned from previous GHE experi-
ences. It is argued here that the introduction of best
practice examples alongside pre-exiting guidance can
provide this assistance. The discussion draws heavily
on the problems highlighted during recent GHEs, and
considers how best practice can serve to implement
some of the solutions which have been advanced to
ensure better preparedness for future health emergen-
cies, a core aspect of which relies upon research
activities.
First, the importance of current dominant
approaches to decision-making in the form of ‘prin-
ciple-like’ and ‘rule-like’ guidelines is considered. An
important first-step in appreciating the value of best
practice lies in appreciating the challenges associated
with rules and principles. It becomes apparent that
these leave the decision maker wanting more in terms
of determining ‘what to do’. Next, a novel perspective is
offered on the role of best practice instantiations as a
more effective alternative, complementary to existing
analyses. The best practice approach represents a middle
ground between principle-like and rule-like guidelines
and offers valuable interpretative support to decision
makers whilst simultaneously capturing and reflecting
lessons learned from previous GHEs. This assists the
translation of the abstract text to the concrete context
in a robust and ethically defensible manner.
Current Challenges in Interpreting
Guidance
This section considers some core challenges of interpret-
ing guidance on conducting research during GHEs.
Whilst discussion on the strengths and limitations of
principle or rule-based decision-making has taken
place at a general level,3 it has focussed on the substance
of principles or rules rather than their suitability as de-
cision-making tools per se. For example, in the GHE and
research context, contributions analyse the suitability of
different values and norms reflected within guidance
and regulatory frameworks, e.g. social value in research
(Ganguli-Mitra et al., 2017), protection of vulnerable
populations (MacIntyre and Travaglia, 2015) or the re-
percussions of procedural requirements stipulated
within guidance (e.g. exclusion of pregnant women
from vaccine trials as considered by the Ethics
Working Group on ZIKV Research and Pregnancy,
2017). Similarly, discussions on international obliga-
tions focus on (lack of) enforceability of guidance,
given their often aspirational nature or status as
‘soft norms’ (Gostin et al., 2015) or their content,
as opposed to the suitability of such guidance in sup-
porting decision makers in their interpretation of
guidelines.
In moving beyond these existing discussions, first, I
consider the strengths and weaknesses of pre-existing
approaches, i.e. principle-like guidance and rule-like
guidance. The key theme that emerges is that while nu-
merous guidelines on GHEs exist, understanding how to
implement these in practice can be problematic. What is
lacking is a middle-ground approach which, as I argue in
the subsequent section, can be provided by the inclusion
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Principle-like and Rule-like Approaches
Current instruction on conducting research during
GHEs often takes the form of principle-like or rule-
like guidance. Principle-like guidance typically mani-
fests as broad, abstract and high-level norms. In con-
trast, rule-like guidance tends to be more specific and
prescriptive. Legal philosophy differentiates between the
two as follows: principles are optimization require-
ments, which can be satisfied to varying degrees
(Alexy, 2002), whereas rules are applicable ‘in an all or
nothing fashion’ (they either apply to a given scenario or
do not) (Dworkin, 1967). Within bioethics, discussions
have tended to focus on ethical principles and their suit-
ability in resolving dilemmas. Criticisms of principle-
based approaches centre on the difficulty in extracting
meaningful action-guiding content from vague abstract
norms (e.g. Clouser and Gert, 1990: Martin and Singer,
2003; Muirhead, 2012; Grill and Dawson, 2017) and
how to reconcile conflicting principles via balancing
(Grill and Dawson, 2017). Within regulatory theory,
there has been a recent proliferation of discussion on
principle-based regulation and rule-based regulation
(e.g. Black, 2010, Devaney, 2011; Sethi, 2015): ‘. . .the
former relies upon broad and looser principles to
guide action and the latter upon stricter pre- and pro-
scriptive rules for framing approaches to governance
and decision-making’ (Laurie and Sethi, 2013: 44).
For the purposes of this discussion, it would be
tempting to caricature guidelines such as the
Declaration of Helsinki as ‘principles’, and, in contra-
distinction, the International Health Regulations, and
legislation more generally, as ‘rules’. However, it is
often difficult to tell whether we are in fact dealing
with a principle or a rule (Laurie and Sethi, 2013).
Consider for example, the guidelines contained in the
CIOMS International Ethical Guidelines for Health-
related Research Involving Humans, collectively referred
to as ‘rules and principles’ (2016: xii); even a brief glance
at the content included within them reveals that it is not
always clear which are which.
Thus, this article resists the temptation to make cat-
egorical claims about whether particular guidance con-
stitutes a principle or rule (or indeed, a ‘norm’ or
‘value’). Rather, the focus is on how we can extract
meaningful action-guiding content from current guide-
lines provided on conducting research during GHEs.
This being said, to understand the limitations of vague
and abstract guidance, as well as specific and prescrip-
tive guidance, a shorthand means of referring to differ-
ent forms of guidance is required. And so, for the
purposes of this discussion, and in keeping with the
definitions offered earlier, I refer to ‘principle-like’ and
‘rule-like’ guidelines throughout and do so thusly: (i)
rule-like guidelines are considered to include norms
which are typically specific and prescriptive, either ap-
plicable or not; whereas (ii) principle-like guidelines are
considered as more abstract optimization maxims, applic-
able to varying degrees and which carry a dimension of
weight, suggesting that different principles can be engaged
in any given scenario, and conflict may arise between
them. Such conceptualizations will be subject to criticism,
but these heuristics nonetheless help to facilitate the dis-
cussion, which seeks to offer a practical solution to the
research community during GHEs. To understand why
current guidelines require additional interpretative sup-
port, the strengths and limitations of principle-like and
rule-like approaches are considered next.
‘Principle-like’ Guidelines
The health research context hosts a variety of principle-
like guidelines. Consider for example those contained
within the Belmont Principles (e.g. ‘respect for persons’)
and the Nuremberg Code (e.g. Principle 7: ‘Proper prep-
arations should be made and adequate facilities pro-
vided to protect the experimental subject against even
remote possibilities of injury, disability, or death’).
Principle-like guidelines can serve various functions
for decision makers (Sethi, 2015), two of which are par-
ticularly noteworthy here. First, they can provide a
common framework and point of reference to support
decision makers in engaging in dialogue with others, not
only in terms of justifying decisions but also in commu-
nicating with stakeholders. For example, in the GHE
context, researchers can appeal to principles to justify
taking certain courses of action. Likewise, where articu-
lated in an open and accessible manner, they can be used
as a frame of reference to engage with research partici-
pants, the local community (the importance of which
has been stressed in the new CIOMS guidelines,
2016, Guideline 7) and the (wider) research commu-
nity including pharmaceutical companies and funding
organizations around key ethical considerations.
However, the utility of such guidelines is limited when
we turn to consider the second function which is based on
a core claim that they provide a guiding function in as-
sisting decision makers in determining what to do.
Paradoxically, principle-like guidelines are problematized
(e.g. Gert, Culver and Clouser, 2000) precisely because of
the lack of (sufficient) action-guiding content. Even
where such guidance is considerably more detailed than
a mere nod to an ethical principle, e.g. ‘respect for au-
tonomy’, it is still difficult to understand how to interpret
RESEARCH DURING GHES: BEST PRACTICE  3
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/phe/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/phe/phy014/5058083
by Edinburgh University user
on 25 July 2018
and apply the norm in a particular setting or context. For
example, the Declaration of Helsinki states, ‘Groups that
are underrepresented in medical research should be pro-
vided appropriate access to participation in research’;
while this guideline reminds us to provide access to
underrepresented groups, it does not suggest what ‘ap-
propriate access’ entails. Indeed, a key challenge of prin-
ciple-like guidance speaks to the vague and abstract
nature of principles (Clouser and Gert, 1990), leaving
too much room for interpretation and rendering it diffi-
cult for the decision maker to extract meaningful action-
guiding content from such high-level norms (Clouser
and Gert, 1990; Muirhead 2012). For example, The
Draft Statement and Guidelines for Disaster Research
states that ‘[a]ll research should be subject to local
ethics review that includes regular feedback from the re-
searchers and community representatives’ (Sumathipala
et al., 2011). Eckenwiler et al. (2015: 656) lament the lack
of guidance on what ‘regular feedback’ entails as a con-
cept or process, and a lack of explanation of ‘how re-
searchers should identify and engage with community
representatives on ethical concerns’. It appears that this
interpretative challenge is widespread. For example, in
their systematic review of guidelines for conducting re-
search in disaster settings, Mezinska et al. (2016) have
noted inconsistent use and application of key concepts
such as ‘risk management’ and ‘direct/indirect benefit’.
A particular complexity in the GHE context lies in the
fact that deliberations around what to do necessitate
room for context-specific considerations,4 which can be
a challenge when dealing with high-level guidelines.
Although there may be overlapping ethical and legal con-
siderations across different GHEs, each has the potential
to bring to the fore unique and novel issues that are spe-
cific to the case in hand. For example, while both Ebola
and Zika raised questions around containment, the latter
attracted particular concerns around adverse pregnancy
outcomes resulting from infection, raising specific ques-
tions around the inclusion of pregnant women in vaccine
development. In commenting on the historical exclusion
of pregnant woman from ‘interventional biomedical re-
search’, the Ethics Working Group on ZIKV Research
and Pregnancy suggests that investigators have been ‘reti-
cent’ to conduct research on pregnant women partly due
to ‘misinterpretations or overly cautious interpretations
of what is allowed under research regulations and inter-
national norms’ (2017: 1). This serves as yet another ex-
ample of the need to offer the research community
additional support in the interpretation of guidelines.
Spatial and temporal considerations must also be fac-
tored-in; as Eckenwiler et al., note (2015), the necessity
for rapid response is heightened in the emergency
setting, decisions must be taken quickly and obtaining
robust and timely ethics review to carry out research can
represent a significant challenge. Eckenwiler et al. have
also pointed out the failure of the Ethical Framework for
the Development and Review of Health Research Proposals
Involving Humanitarian Contexts guideline on REC
oversight. The authors state that in focussing on ‘adverse
events from vaccines, drugs, and medical procedures’,
the framework fails to include ‘the range of emergent
and evolving social, political and economic vulnerabil-
ities to which researchers and RECs should ideally re-
spond’ (2015: 656). Context-specific guidance is also
needed on the appropriate standard of care provided
by researchers to research participants, which
Mezinska et al. (2016) suggest is lacking amongst the
guidelines on research which they have reviewed.
Similarly, geographical challenges and limited access
to willing and suitably informed research participants
can be problematic (Levine et al., 2004). Additionally,
the potential of new technologies, particularly those
around data sharing and analysis, have motivated the
inclusion of new guidelines (e.g. CIOMS, 2016) the
practical application of which necessitates further sup-
port for decision makers.
A further challenge that arises in principle-like guide-
lines is that given their dimension of weight, and the fact
that more than one principle can be engaged in any
given scenario, conflict can arise between principles.
Balancing is often invoked as a means to resolve this
conflict whereby each relevant principle is assigned a
weight (e.g. Beauchamp and Childress, 2013). For ex-
ample, in the case of Ebola, the imperative of rapid re-
sponse had to be weighed against the principle of
obtaining informed consent for the use of specimens
for future research (Schopper et al., 2017). However,
balancing has been extensively problematized, given
the lack of clarity on how to balance,5 and the task of
assigning weights to different principles has been
described as ‘measuring the immeasurable’ (Frantz,
1963: 729). The WHO Guidance for Managing Ethical
Issues in Infectious Disease Outbreaks (2016: 21) acknow-
ledges the need to balance competing principles; for ex-
ample, it considers the conflict which can arise between
utility (maximizing benefit and minimizing burden)
and equity (which relies on fair distribution). The
Guidance recognizes recognizes that ‘there is no single
correct way to resolve potential tensions’ between the
principles and although the text highlights further con-
siderations related to these principles (e.g. ensuring
transparency in decision-making, the needs of vulner-
able populations, reciprocity), it stops short of offering
4  SETHI
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concrete examples of how these principles can be justi-
fiably balanced against each other.
‘Rule-like’ Guidelines
One solution towards addressing the challenge of know-
ing how to implement broad and abstract guidelines is
to offer more prescriptive iterations of what to do (often
in the form of rule-like guidelines), but these can easily
become overly specific (Bennett Moses, 2007) and thus
lose their necessary flexibility and applicability to a var-
iety of different scenarios. Indeed, guidelines must cover
a wide range of research activities ‘from epidemiological
and socio-behavioral to clinical trials and toxicity stu-
dies, all of which are crucial’ (Kieny, 2016).
A prime example of overly specific guidance and the
interpretative challenges, which it can give rise to, is
evident from the avian influenza (H5N1) pandemic.
Although wider debates around benefit-sharing and
access to treatments dominated (Fidler, 2010; Smith,
2012), the pandemic raised important interpretative
challenges to international regulations. Issues arose
around the ownership of biological samples of viruses
and delineating which obligations were incumbent
upon states in terms of sharing these samples with
other countries (Sedyaningsih et al., 2008; Mullis
2009). Access to virus samples is paramount to identify
pathogens and to develop appropriate treatments, par-
ticularly vaccines. Numerous varying interpretations
around which obligations states must fulfil were dis-
cussed in the case of H5N1, and one argument advanced
by Indonesia was that even though the then relevant
International Health Regulations (1969) did oblige the
sharing of biological virus samples between states, influ-
enza was not expressly included as one of the diseases
which was subject to those regulations (Fidler, 2008).
Subsequent discussions made clear that the intention
of the IHR was to include the sharing of influenza
viruses. However, Indonesia attempted to rely upon
an omission to explicitly include influenza within the
relevant set of rules, thus rendering the lack of specificity
open to varying interpretation. This led to a significant
hold up for the research community in terms of gaining
timely access to virus samples and developing vaccines
in a setting where rapid response was crucial. More re-
cently, it has been noted that prior to the Ebola out-
break, the majority of WHO ethics guidance was disease
specific (e.g. focussing on ethical issues relating to tu-
berculosis). Ebola has highlighted the need for more
general guidance for ‘ethics in outbreaks and epidemics
more generally’ (Selgelid, 2016).
A further difficulty in the GHE research context is
that pre-existing rule-like guidance—particularly legis-
lation—can be both over- and under-inclusive of new
technologies (Bennett Moses, 2007) which have the po-
tential to transform and greatly improve the manage-
ment of prevention/response/support activities for
populations in crisis.6 Consider the rapid technological
developments which have taken place around the use of
data, not only in terms of surveillance of GHE spread
but for research purposes. One of the core drivers for the
revision of the International Health Regulations (1969,
as amended) was the need to establish a global surveil-
lance system for GHEs (Baker and Fidler, 2006). In turn,
the pre-existing IHR did not adequately reflect the need
and related potential of data sharing to greatly
strengthen both surveillance and research. While the
revised IHR 2005 did strengthen requirements for sur-
veillance, legal barriers remain an impediment against
data sharing in the context of GHEs, not only during but
after an emergency has taken place. For example Sane
and Edelstein (2015: 10) report ‘. . .lack of formal or
informal data-sharing agreements across borders, lack
of an enforcement mechanism for the IHR, and intel-
lectual property rights and data ownership, all hindered
transparent sharing. Compliance with different national
legislations was seen as particularly challenging’.
Another problem of overly prescriptive guidance is
that such approaches can inhibit the research community
from trying out new research methods which may actu-
ally constitute best practices in the particular context of a
specific disease. Disputes arose around the most appro-
priate trial design for developing Ebola vaccines, with
certain stakeholders insisting that methods should
follow established protocols on randomized control
trials, whilst others argued that flexibility to try alterna-
tive trial design was necessary (Caplan et al., 2015; Keusch
et al., 2017). These disputes led to untimely delays in
discovering ‘safe and effective products in time to fight
the epidemic’.7 It is imperative that to avoid similar
delays should a new GHE epidemic emerge—which
raises similar questions around trial design—additional
support is available to decision makers which folds in the
experiences already.
Accompanying Text
It is important to acknowledge that, perhaps in recog-
nition of the challenges and limitations of current guide-
lines, and of vague and abstract principle-like guidelines
in particular, guidance on conducting research during
GHEs is often accompanied by explanatory text. For
example, each CIOMS guideline is supported by a
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‘commentary’. The WHO Guidance for Managing
Ethical Issues in Infectious Disease Outbreaks (produced
as a response to ethical issues raised by the Ebola out-
break) contains 14 specific guidelines, each of which is
‘introduced by a series of questions that illustrate the
scope of the ethical issues, followed by a more detailed
discussion that articulates the rights and obligations of
relevant stakeholders’ (WHO, 2016: 10). Likewise, the
‘Belmont Principles’ are situated within a Part 3
Belmont Report (1979), which includes a statement on
the distinction between treatment and research and ‘re-
marks’ about the application of the principles. Despite
these valuable accompanying texts, I argue that we must
go one step further in supporting decision makers in
their interpretation of guidelines. The utility of explana-
tory text is limited because it often lacks concrete illus-
trations of how principles are worked through in
practice, which reflect real-world examples and lessons
learned from previous GHEs—a function which best
practice examples perform.
Best Practice: Learning from the
Ground up?
Thus far, we have considered the challenges which
guidelines on conducting GHEs can present for those
wishing to conduct research during this time. Both
high-level and prescriptive guidelines have their own
strengths and drawbacks, interpretative challenges
remain and a means of capturing ‘lessons learned’ ef-
fectively is often lacking. A mid-level approach is needed
which simultaneously (i) retains the flexibility of prin-
ciple-like guidelines and avoids the pitfalls of overly spe-
cific rule-like guidelines; (ii) supports decision makers
in extracting action-guiding content from guidelines
and (iii) folds in important lessons already acquired
from previous GHEs. The remaining sections consider
in turn how the inclusion of best practice examples in
guidance can meet all of these requirements.
Best Practice: Making the Most out of
Principle-like and Rule-like Guidelines
As considered earlier, guidelines advanced for conduct-
ing research during GHEs often take the form of high-
level broad principle-like or specific rule-like guidelines.
A novel conceptualization of best practice is offered
here, as a mid-level translational mechanism, serving
as a bridge from text to context, more specific than prin-
ciple-like guidelines, yet not so specific as rule-like
guidelines. It is helpful to imagine a continuum, upon
which abstract and high-level principle-like guidelines
exist on one end, and as guidance becomes progressively
more detailed, we approach the other end of the con-
tinuum,8 occupied by more prescriptive rule-like guide-
lines, i.e. solid instruction on what to do. Best practice
examples are situated in the middle of this continuum,
they are more detailed manifestations of high-level prin-
ciple-like guidelines and demonstrations of how such
guidelines can be applied at a practical level, based on
concrete cases, but they lack the prescriptive ‘all or noth-
ing’ nature of rule-like guidelines.
This conceptualization of best practice combines two
important methodologies associated with principle-like
guidelines: specification and casuistry. Specification
relies on deductive reasoning to progressively narrow
the scope of an initial abstract norm and to render it
less indeterminate (Richardson, 2000; Beauchamp,
2003). But unlike specification, the movement from
the principle-like guidelines towards a practical example
of the ‘guideline in action’ does not tell the decision
maker exactly what to do with regards to their own par-
ticular situation; rather, it acts as a guide in terms of how
the relevant guideline might be fleshed-out through the
provision of a real world example. Most importantly, this
serves as a further basis on which to justify the particular
decision that is taken in any given context.
It is important to note that the conceptualization of
best practice offered here relates to the examples of
guidelines in action which are known to work well
and which incorporate core values from the principle-
like guidelines for which they support interpretation.
Although using the terminology of‘best’ practice, I am
not commenting substantively on what constitutes ‘best’
in a given scenario amongst all possible actions arising
from a guideline. If a practice or example has previously
been judged as ‘best practice’, it suggests a degree of
(ethical) credential, albeit with the caveat that context
is always key. Direct transplants will rarely be possible.
Rather best practice instances provide ethical fence posts
on the journey towards a concrete and defensible
decision.
Seen in this way, best practice then relies upon the
ability of the decision maker to draw an analogy between
the best practice example offered, and the situation with
which they are faced. This is akin to casuistry—case-
based reasoning—which implies comparison of a cur-
rent case or dilemma with an analogous or paradigm
case. Such an approach relies on ‘the way in which cir-
cumstances and maxims appear in the morphology of
the case itself and in comparison with similar cases’
(Jonsen, 1991: 303). For example, Siedner et al. consider
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varying approaches taken around emergency measures
such as quarantines and closure of public buildings
during GHEs. They contrast recent approaches to con-
tainment of Ebola—which led to distrust amongst local
communities—with previous ‘more successful’
approaches (earlier Ebola Outbreaks and the Nipah
Outbreak) which centred on community partnership.
A key lesson learned, is that ‘In hindsight, some of the
negative fallout from decisions to use extraordinary
measures might have been avoided had WHO, in part-
nership with local community leaders and public health
experts, more assertively used their legitimacy to cau-
tion against the use of coercive measures without an
evidence base’ (Siedner et al., 2015: 4). This can repre-
sent a paradigm case for drawing analogies should a
similar health emergency arise which necessitates quar-
antine and where cultural practices of local commu-
nities and strict international protocol on how to
respond to a particular GHE may conflict, where the
best practice is ‘to promote partnership with local stake-
holders and identify locally acceptable response strate-
gies’ (Siedner et al., 2015: 1). In contrast with casuistry,
best practice has the added advantages of (i) already
being ‘connected’ to the relevant principle-like guide-
lines, whereas casuistry necessitates that the decision
maker first draw analogy (relying upon their own ex-
periences) and then identifies relevant principles and
(ii) best practice instantiations are already provided to
decision makers, so that they do not have to rely on their
own (lack) of experience, but can benefit from the col-
lective experience of the stakeholders involved in iden-
tifying best practice instantiations. Furthermore, best
practice can help to better incorporate and reflect into
guidance the practical realities and experiences of the
research community during GHEs.9 The importance
of more grounded decision-making, which addresses
important theory practice gaps (Robeyns, 2008) be-
tween guidelines and practical issues arising ‘on the
ground’ has been stressed within bioethics for some
time (e.g. Wolf, 1994) and more recently so in the con-
text of global health research (e.g. Aellah, Chantler and
Geissler, 2016). For example, again in the context of
Ebola, the question of the permissibility of using inter-
ventions not yet tested on humans was raised (WHO,
2014). Standard international guidance normally ad-
vises against such use and a special WHO panel was
convened to consider the question, ultimately agreeing
that such uses were permissible, subject to certain con-
ditions being met. Should a further GHE arise where
similar questions around suitability of untested inter-
ventions arise, having readily accessible best practice
which reflects these lessons, and the considerations of
the convening panel, can provide the research commu-
nity with the confidence that if they satisfy similar terms
and conditions laid out in the case of Ebola, they can
make the case for the use of such treatments without
time-consuming recourse to a panel.
Consider also the impact of the Zika virus and the
question of including pregnant women in clinical trials
of vaccines. A recent report from the Ethics Working
Group on ZIKV Research and Pregnancy (2017) in-
cludes guidance on the inclusion of pregnant women
in vaccine development. It is noted that pregnant
women have historically been excluded from such re-
search. Drawing upon expertise and lessons learned over
the course of the ongoing Zika emergency, the working
group offers recommendations on ‘the conditions under
which is it ethically acceptable, if not required, to in-
clude pregnant women in ZIKV vaccine trials’ (2017: 1).
The authors of the report are clear in laying out the
parameters of their guidance, in that it is applicable to
‘the current situation of continuing ZIKV outbreaks
with limited effective prevention modalities and no
existing vaccine approved for use, as well as to any
future scenarios in which critical evidence gaps remain
on the safety and efficacy of ZIKV vaccines in preg-
nancy’ (2017: 1). It could be argued that the recommen-
dations laid out by the Working Group—particularly
regarding their risks/benefits test—could constitute
best practice in sufficiently similar scenarios wherein
pregnant women are particularly affected by any
future GHEs which require the development of new
vaccines.
Data sharing represents another useful illustration.
Sharing information is becoming increasingly prevalent
in the research context. Indeed, in recognition of the
significance of the use of data for research purposes,
the scope of the recently revised CIOMS Guidelines
(CIOMS, 2016) has been extended ‘from biomedical
research to health-related research because the term bio-
medical research would not cover research with health-
related data’. During GHEs, timely access to accurate
data is paramount, particularly to tend to limited evi-
dence bases, identify viruses, understand how they
spread and develop effective treatments (e.g. Lurie et
al., 2013). There is also a dearth of evidence around
effective response mechanisms during GHEs (CIOMS,
2016). Consider the following principle and corres-
ponding best practice instantiation:
Principle: Data controllers should demonstrate their
commitment to privacy protection through the devel-
opment and implementation of appropriate and trans-
parent policies.
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Best Practice: Appropriate disclosure control should be
applied to all outputs; this should be carried out under
the authority and oversight of the designated privacy
officer.
Thus, the aforementioned best practice instantiation
offers the decision maker one example of how data con-
trollers can balance their commitment to privacy pro-
tection with the specific example of disclosure control,
but it does not imply that this is the only way to dem-
onstrate respect for the initial principle. In addition to
(or alternative to) disclosure control, the practical im-
plementation of this principle might include requiring
anonymization, pseudonymization or the obtaining of
consent. Thus, best practice examples do not necessarily
point the decision maker towards a definitive answer. As
the Nuffield Council on Bioethics notes, offering an
overly specific rule-like norm ‘may proscribe solutions
that can optimise ethical data use according to legitim-
ate and possibly diverse values’ (2015: 87). Rather, by
offering practical examples of manifestations of under-
lying rules and principles, they guide the decision
makers towards the ‘types’ of application which
should be made.
It is acknowledged that appeals to best practice will still
necessitate the exercise of discretion on the part of the
decision maker. Yet, another related advantage of best
practice is that where analogies can be drawn between
the best practice example included with guidance and
the decision being taken in a given situation, decision
makers must also justify why they have chosen to rely
upon a particular interpretation/draw analogy or equally
why they chose not to do so, thus facilitating the import-
ant critical reflection and discussion on research govern-
ance in the humanitarian setting (e.g. Schopper et al.,
2015). One key observation on a recent meeting address-
ing research and innovation during GHEs (Nuffield
Council on Bioethics, 2016: 6) was that:
Compliance and ethics are different things, and
there is no substitute for a moral compass guiding
one in what is right to do in an awful situation. At
the same time, mechanisms by which people can
be held to account for the decisions they make in
those situations are needed. . .This is a challenge
for regulators and for ethicists: not just guidelines
or tick boxes that ‘let people off the hook’ from
using their judgment.
Thus, best practice instantiations can support the neces-
sary and inevitable exercise of discretion on the part of
the decision maker, and like principles offer a common
language and framework with which to engage in dia-
logue. However, they avoid the pitfalls of being as vague
and as vulnerable to interpretative latitude and disagree-
ment as principles alone. It is acknowledged that the
decision maker must still decide when a guideline is
applicable, interpret it, balance it against competing
guidelines (which must also be interpreted) and draw
an analogy with the best practice instantiation provided
and the decision which they are facing, and then con-
sider how to implement it in practice. But precise deter-
mination is not the telos of the application of best
practice instantiations. They are designed to guide de-
cision makers towards the type of determination that
they should work towards. Such an approach does
not, cannot and should not obviate the exercise of dis-
cretion. Equally, as has been argued throughout, best
practice offers the decision maker more support in exer-
cising this discretion than rules or principles alone.
How Do We Determine What Best Practice Is?
It is appreciated that identification of best practice in-
stantiations is not necessarily a straight-forward task.
Indeed, the ‘best’ in best practice suggests that there is
always a morally sound, good outcome, but the ad-
equacy of ideal theory in the disaster setting has been
called into question (e.g. Schwartz et al., 2014). It may be
that ‘best’ practice in a given situation is ‘the lesser of
two evils’ or the ‘better’ action amongst many potential
actions, all of which may be nonideal (e.g. O’Mathuna,
2016).
A further challenge is that on its face, ‘best practice’
can be viewed as a subjective evaluation, and paradigm
examples of guidelines in action may vary depending
upon whom one asks to provide them. However, certain
approaches can contribute towards developing best
practice instantiations which genuinely reflect practical,
helpful examples from the ground up. This requires col-
laboration and sharing of experiences amongst key
stakeholders—first and foremost—the research com-
munity. Such collaborative exercises already take place
in the context of guideline development; revision of the
updated CIOMS Guidelines involved an iterative and
deliberative process which included wide international
stakeholder consultation and ‘evidence retrieval’ based
on key literatures and pre-existing guidelines.10
Similarly, the Ethics Working Group on ZIKV
Research and Pregnancy membership comprise clin-
icians working on Zika and public health as well as bio-
ethicists. The consultation strategy involved
engagement with ‘experts from a variety of organisa-
tions including: global and national public health agen-
cies and regulatory authorities; public and private
research institutions; pharmaceutical companies;
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public and private funders; medical associations specific
to obstetrics and maternal–fetal medicine; and non-
profit NGOs working on maternal child health and/or
emergency response effort’ (2017: 68).
Of paramount importance is the involvement of local
communities early on in partnership with the research
community (Quinn, 2004; Morin et al., 2008). As
Siedner et al. (2015: 4) report in considering lessons
learned from Ebola:
A rich institutional knowledge about best practices
for community advisory boards exists from the
research community and, in combination with
recent experience gained through collaborations
with community leaders during the current epi-
demic, can serve as the basis for much-needed
guidelines for public health activities. Members
should represent divergent interests and include
religious leaders, community representatives, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and other
stakeholders. The body should be briefed on the
status of the threat and called on to offer recom-
mendations on community desensitization, cap-
acity building, and control measures.
Thus, it is fundamental that best practice is generated
from the ground up, and that examples offered genuinely
reflect the experiences of those involved with conduct-
ing and undergoing research-related activities during
GHEs and that this is done in a rapid, time-responsive
manner.
It is also crucial that examples identified as ‘best prac-
tice’ are constantly kept under review, as circumstantial
developments (e.g. discovery of new treatment and ex-
acerbation of spread) may change what constitutes best
practice in a given context. Best practice should be
monitored and subject to revision, incorporating ‘feed-
back-loops’11 between researchers who are applying
them on the ground and those responsible for dissemi-
nating best practice.
Who/WHO Disseminates Best Practice?
Whilst the previous section suggested that a wide variety
of stakeholders must be involved in the identification
and formulation of best practice, the question of who
might be charged with disseminating best practice in-
stantiations is also significant. Given their integral role
in declaring public health emergencies of international
concern and in collaborating with key actors involved in
conducting research during such emergencies, it is
worthwhile considering whether the WHO might be
best placed to act as a ‘curator’ of best practice instan-
tiations. The WHO could take responsibility for
collecting examples offered by numerous actors
involved in conducting research during GHEs (e.g.
Global Research Collaboration for Infectious Disease
Preparedness; Médecins Sans Frontières).
Best practice could then be made readily available on a
publicly accessible open repository web platform via the
WHO website. Such ‘best practice’ could ultimately be
folded-in to guidance when it is revised, by for example,
not only the WHO but CIOMs. This avoids the pitfalls on
time lapses associated with reliance on the development
of new guidelines. As van Delden and van der Graaf note
(2017), the recently revised CIOMS Guidance was antici-
pated for some time, given the new challenges which had
emerged since its previous iteration.
As indicated throughout this article, there is already a
pool of best practice instantiations which can be pro-
actively identified in anticipation of future GHEs and
already made available to the research community. The
WHO also offers best practice in the form of bulletins,
such as that on sharing information through data plat-
forms (Moorthy et al., 2016). The WHO Emergency
Response Framework (ERF) sets out as one of its core
functions to ‘promote and monitor the application of
national and, where necessary, international, protocols,
health standards, methodologies, tools and best prac-
tices, continually’ (2013: 56).
It is appreciated that such approaches are not without
limitations, particularly regarding the challenges of
reaching consensus in the development of best practice
(Schuklenk, 2017), as each individual or organization
consulted will inevitably reflect their own version of
best practice which is informed by their experiences
and bias. Furthermore, like any regulatory mechanism,
best practice can only take us so far in terms of addressing
the many complexities involved in research during GHEs.
For example, the exclusion of pregnant women in re-
search speaks to wider issues such as the classification
of pregnant women as a ‘vulnerable population’ (van
der Zande et al., 2017). Best practice may represent one
potential mechanism of demonstrating more ‘proactive
and intentional inclusion of pregnant women’s interests
in the R&D agenda’ (Krubiner and Faden, 2017) but one
which is reliant upon wider change, including more fa-
cilitative overarching guidelines. Thus, the suitability of
best practice instantiations is dependent upon the appro-
priateness of higher-level guidelines, the interpretation of
which best practice are designed support; if the first-order
principles or rules are ethically problematic, they may
give rise to problematic best practice. Just as best practice
must be constantly kept under review, reflective equilib-
rium (Rawls, 1971) of overarching principles and rules is
fundamental.
RESEARCH DURING GHES: BEST PRACTICE  9
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/phe/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/phe/phy014/5058083
by Edinburgh University user
on 25 July 2018
It must also be noted that whilst the inclusion of best
practice is imperative, it is but one element of the com-
plex landscape of GHEs and research. Wider factors are
also in play, including power-relations, socio-cultural
and historical factors, and these dynamics may persist
regardless of the decision-making approach adopted.
Further consideration of such factors is beyond the
scope of this article, but these limitations should not
denigrate from the significance of ensuring that the
best procedures are in place to identify, collate and
share best practice, which should be an inclusive process
which genuinely engages with key stakeholders and the
variety of issues which must be considered when con-
ducting research during GHEs, particularly around en-
gagement with communities.12
Where No Current Best Practice Exists
A final challenge to the introduction of best practice in
guidance is where no current best practice exists. This
will be particularly relevant when considering the gov-
ernance of novel technologies or research methodolo-
gies in the wake of previously unexperienced GHEs. As
with legislation in general, the challenge of being unable
to foresee every possible eventuality remains. It is argued
that best practice remains invaluable nonetheless in a
wide-array of settings where pre-established best prac-
tice does exist, but where it has not yet been captured
alongside guidelines. Further, there is an important role
to be played by third party actors in supporting re-
searchers (Laurie et al., 2018), which, it is argued here,
also includes a responsibility to identify possible in-
stances of best practice across a range of settings, even
perhaps where connections across different contexts
may not be immediately apparent. Indeed, the GHE
context gives rise to numerous opportunities for sharing
best practice as cooperation between different actors be-
comes more prolific, particularly by virtue of the
number of collaborative frameworks and networks
which appear to be increasing. Further research into
the ways in which best practice instantiations are iden-
tified, developed, proliferated, used and revised is also
needed to make the most out of these decision-making
aids.
Conclusion
This article has offered insights into a previously over-
looked yet integral aspect of conducting research during
GHEs, i.e. analysis of the suitability of principle-like and
rule-like guidelines. Further, it has demonstrated the
necessity and value of including best practice instanti-
ations alongside pre-existing guidelines. It has been
argued that current principle-like and rule-like guide-
lines are inadequate on their own; they still leave the
decision maker in need of additional support to deter-
mine what to do. Best practice instantiations represent
an important interpretative tool which tends to this gap.
They offer the decision maker examples of the ways in
which guidelines ought to be interpreted, whilst retain-
ing necessary flexibility to tailor norms appropriately
according to the specific demands of the decision at
hand. Furthermore, best practice also provides a
means of capturing lessons learned from previous
GHEs and incorporating them into future decision-
making. A key lesson which emerges time and time
again in the aftermath of GHEs is our need to be
better prepared for the next GHE, providing the re-
search community with pre-existing best practice in-
stantiations can better arm the community with
decision-making support for when the next emergency
hits, rather than the current tendency to learn after an
event. Just as ‘we have to break from the habit of funding
from crisis to crisis’ (Stinchcomb, 2016), we must also
break the habit of failing to learn from the past. Indeed,
the inclusion of best practice alongside guidelines en-
sures that our past experiences render us better prepared
for the future.
Notes
1. GHEs are interpreted in this article to include not
only WHO declared PHEICs, but additionally, ‘dis-
asters’ and ‘humanitarian crises’ that may fall out
with the WHO definition, but which nonetheless
carry with them the same implications as PHEICs.
Note that for the purposes of this article, I refer to
GHE throughout and only use the term PHEIC
when making specific reference to PHEICs declared
as such by the WHO.
2. For broader discussion, see Ganguli Mitra and Sethi
(2016) Conducting research in the context of GHEs:
identifying key ethical and governance issues.
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4. For discussion see Musschenga (2005); Aveling et al.
(2016).
5. See, for example Bix (1998); Harris (2003); Greer
(2004) and Albertzart (2014).
6. See for example, the work of Innovative Support to
Emergencies Diseases and Disasters (InSTEDD),
available from: http://instedd.org/ [accessed 10
July 2017] and Coyle and Meier (2009).
7. Testimony of Edward Cox, director, Office of
Microbial Products, U.S. Food and Drug
Administration. Public Webinar with International
Regulators of the Committee on Clinical Trials
during the 2014–2015 Ebola Outbreak. WebEx,
May 2016 as cited in Cohen and Kupferschmidt
(2014: 47).
8. Goodin has suggested that rules are more detailed
principles, and that the relationship between them
can be described as existing upon a continuum: see
Goodin (1982).
9. See for example, Nuffield Council on Bioethics
workshop (2016).
10. For a detailed account of the revision process, see:
Van Delden (2016).
11. On feedback loops, see Taylor-Alexander et al.
(2016) and Ganguli-Mitra et al. (2017).
12. See for example, the work of MESH, particularly in
identifying ‘good practices’, available from: https://
mesh.tghn.org/ [accessed 14 July 2017].
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